THE WHITE HOUSE -Office of the Press Secretary
  
  _______________________________________________________________
  
  For Immediate Release                          November 9, 1995
  
  
  
  
  TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: 
  
  
       On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the 
  proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons 
  ("weapons of mass destruction") and of the means of delivering 
  such weapons, I issued Executive Order No. 12938, and declared 
  a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic 
  Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.).  Under section 202(d) of 
  the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national 
  emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration, 
  unless I publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the 
  Congress a notice of its continuation.
  
       The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues 
  to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
  security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.  
  Therefore, I am hereby advising the Congress that the national 
  emergency declared on November 14, 1994, must continue in effect 
  beyond November 14, 1995.  Accordingly, I have extended the 
  national emergency declared in Executive Order No. 12938 and 
  have sent the attached notice of extension to the Federal 
  Register for publication.
  
       As I described in the report transmitting Executive 
  Order No. 12938, the Executive order consolidated the functions 
  of and revoked Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990, 
  which declared a national emergency with respect to the 
  proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, and Executive 
  Order No. 12930 of September 29, 1994, which declared a national 
  emergency with respect to nuclear, biological, and chemical 
  weapons, and their means of delivery.
  
       The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of 
  the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) 
  and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
  1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant 
  to the emergency declaration.  Additional information on 
  nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) 
  nonproliferation efforts is contained in the annual Report on 
  the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of 
  Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to the 
  Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National Defense 
  Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 
  102-190), also known as the "Nonproliferation Report," and the 
  annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308 
  of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare 
  Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182).
  
       The three export control regulations issued under the 
  Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) are fully in 
  force and continue to be used to control the export of items 
  with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned 
  delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
  
       In the 12 months since I issued Executive Order No. 12938, 
  26 additional countries ratified the Convention on the 
  Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
  Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) for a 
  total of 42 of the 159 signatories; the CWC must be ratified 
  by 65 signatories to enter into force.  I must report my 
  disappointment that the United States is not yet among those 
  who have ratified.  The CWC is a critical element of U.S. 
  nonproliferation policy and an urgent next step in our effort 
  to end the development, production, stockpiling, transfer, and 
  use of chemical weapons.  As we have seen this year in Japan, 
  chemical weapons can threaten our security and that of our 
  allies, whether as an instrument of war or of terrorism.  The 
  CWC will make every American safer, and we need it now.
  
       The international community is watching.  It is vitally 
  important that the United States continue to lead the fight 
  against weapons of mass destruction by being among the first 
  65 countries to ratify the CWC.  The Senate recognized the 
  importance of this agreement by adopting a bipartisan amendment 
  on September 5, 1995, expressing the sense of the Senate that 
  the United States should promptly ratify the CWC.  I urge the 
  Senate to give its advice and consent as soon as possible.
  
       In parallel with seeking Senate ratification of the CWC, 
  the United States is working hard in the CWC Preparatory 
  Commission (PrepCom) in The Hague to draft administrative and 
  implementing procedures for the CWC and to create a strong 
  organization for verifying compliance once the CWC enters into 
  force.
  
       The United States also is working vigorously to end the 
  threat of biological weapons (BW).  We are an active participant 
  in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development and 
  Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons 
  and Their Destruction (BWC) Ad Hoc Group, which was commissioned 
  September 1994 by the BWC Special Conference to draft a legally 
  binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve 
  the implementation of the Convention.  The Group convened its 
  first meeting in January 1995 and agreed upon a program of work 
  for this year. The first substantive meeting took place in July, 
  making important progress in outlining the key issues.  The next 
  meeting is scheduled for November 27 to December 8, 1995.  The 
  U.S. objective is to have a draft protocol for consideration and 
  adoption at the Fourth BWC Review Conference in December 1996.
  
       The United States continues to be active in the work of the 
  29-member Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime, and 
  attended the October 16-19 AG consultations.  The Group agreed 
  to a United States proposal to ensure the AG export controls 
  and information-sharing adequately address the threat of CBW 
  terrorism, a threat that became all too apparent in the Tokyo 
  subway nerve gas incident.  This U.S. initiative was the AG's 
  first policy-level action on CBW terrorism.  Participants also 
  agreed to several amendments to strengthen the AG's harmonized 
  export controls on materials and equipment relevant to 
  biological weapons, taking into account new developments since 
  the last review of the biological weapons lists and, in 
  particular, new insights into Iraq's BW activities.
  
       The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief 
  that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC will be the only way 
  to achieve a permanent global ban on CBW, and that all states 
  adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to ensure that 
  their national activities support these goals.
  
       Australia Group participants are taking steps to ensure 
  that all relevant national measures promote the object and 
  purposes of the BWC and CWC, and will be fully consistent with 
  the CWC upon its entry into force.  The AG considers that 
  national export licensing policies on chemical weapons-related 
  items fulfill the obligation established under Article I of 
  the CWC that States Parties never assist, in any way, the 
  acquisition of chemical weapons.  Moreover, inasmuch as these 
  measures are focused solely on preventing activities banned 
  under the CWC, they are consistent with the undertaking in 
  Article XI of the CWC to facilitate the fullest possible 
  exchange of chemical materials and related information for 
  purposes not prohibited by the CWC.
  
       The AG agreed to continue its active program of briefings 
  for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on 
  export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and 
  understanding of national policies in these areas.
  
       The United States Government determined that two foreign 
  companies -- Mainway Limited and GE Plan -- had engaged in 
  chemical weapons proliferation activities that required the 
  imposition of sanctions against them, effective May 18, 1995.  
  Additional information on this determination is contained in 
  a classified report to the Congress, provided pursuant to the 
  Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination 
  Act of 1991.
  
       The United States carefully controlled exports which 
  could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of 
  mass destruction, exercising restraint in considering all such 
  proposed transfers consistent with the Guidelines of the Missile 
  Technology Control Regime (MTCR).  The MTCR Partners continued 
  to share information about proliferation problems with each 
  other and with other possible supplier, consumer, and 
  transshipment states.  Partners also emphasized the need for 
  implementing effective export control systems.
  
       The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination 
  with its MTCR partners in multilateral efforts to combat missile 
  proliferation by nonmembers and to encourage nonmembers to 
  export responsibly and to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines.  Three 
  new Partners were admitted to the MTCR with U.S. support:  
  Russia, South Africa, and Brazil.
  
       In May 1995, the United States participated in an MTCR 
  team visit to Kiev to discuss missile nonproliferation and MTCR 
  membership criteria.  Under Secretary of State Davis met with 
  Ukraine's Deputy Foreign Minister Hryshchenko in May, July, and 
  October to discuss nonproliferation issues and MTCR membership.  
  As a result of the July meeting, a United States delegation 
  traveled to Kiev in October to conduct nonproliferation talks 
  with representatives of Ukraine, brief them on the upcoming 
  MTCR Plenary, and discuss U.S. criteria for MTCR membership.  
  From August 29 - September 1, the U.S. participated in an 
  informal seminar with 18 other MTCR Partners in Montreux, 
  Switzerland, to explore future approaches to strengthening 
  missile nonproliferation.
  
       The MTCR held its Tenth Plenary Meeting in Bonn 
  October 10-12.  The Partners reaffirmed their commitment 
  to controlling exports to prevent proliferation of delivery 
  systems for weapons of mass destruction.  They also reiterated 
  their readiness for international cooperation in peaceful space 
  activities consistent with MTCR policies.  The Bonn Plenary made 
  minor amendments to the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex in 
  the light of technical developments.  Partners also agreed to 
  U.S. initiatives to deal more effectively with missile-related 
  aspects of regional tensions, coordinate in impeding shipments 
  of missile proliferation concern, and deal with the 
  proliferation risks posed by transshipment.  Finally, MTCR 
  Partners will increase their efforts to develop a dialogue with 
  countries outside the Regime to encourage voluntary adherence to 
  the MTCR Guidelines and heightened awareness of missile 
  proliferation risks.
  
       The United States has continued to pursue my 
  Administration's nuclear nonproliferation goals with success.  
  Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
  Weapons (NPT) agreed last May at the NPT Review and Extension 
  Conference to extend the NPT indefinitely and without 
  conditions.  Since the conference, more nations have acceded to 
  the Treaty.  There now are 180 parties, making the NPT nearly 
  universal.
  
       The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) continues its efforts 
  to improve member states' export policies and controls.  
  Nuclear Suppliers Group members have agreed to apply technology 
  controls to all items on the nuclear trigger list and to adopt 
  the principle that the intent of the NSG Guidelines should not 
  be undermined by the export of parts of trigger list and 
  dual-use items without appropriate controls.  In 1995, the NSG 
  agreed to over 30 changes to update and clarify the list of 
  controlled items in the Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Annex.  The NSG 
  also pursued efforts to enhance information sharing among 
  members by establishment of a permanent Joint Information 
  Exchange group and by moving toward adoption of a United States 
  Department of Energy-supplied computerized automated information 
  exchange system, which is currently being tested by most of the 
  members.
  
       The increasing number of countries capable of exporting 
  nuclear commodities and technology is a major challenge for the 
  NSG.  The ultimate goal of the NSG is to obtain the agreement 
  of all suppliers, including nations not members of the regime, 
  to control nuclear exports in accordance with the NSG 
  guidelines.  Members continued contacts with Belarus, Brazil, 
  China, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and 
  Ukraine regarding NSG activities.  Ambassador Patokallio of 
  Finland, the current NSG Chair, led a five-member NSG outreach 
  visit to Brazil in early November 1995 as part of this effort.
  
       As a result of such contacts, the ROK has been accepted 
  as a member of the NSG.  Ukraine is expected to apply for 
  membership in the near future.  The United States maintains 
  bilateral contacts with emerging suppliers, including the New 
  Independent States of the former Soviet Union, to encourage 
  early adherence to NSG guidelines.
  
       Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies 
  Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses 
  directly attributable to the exercise of authorities conferred 
  by the declaration of the national emergency in Executive 
  Order No. 12938 during the period from May 14, 1995, through 
  November 14, 1995.
  
  
  
                                     WILLIAM J. CLINTON
  
  
  
  THE WHITE HOUSE,
      November 8, 1995.
  

  
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THE WHITE HOUSE
  
                    Office of the Press Secretary
  
  _______________________________________________________________
  
  For Immediate Release                          November 9, 1995
  
  
  
  
                                NOTICE
  
                            - - - - - - - 
  
                 CONTINUATION OF EMERGENCY REGARDING
  
                     WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
  
  
       On November 14, 1994, by Executive Order No. 12938, I 
  declared a national emergency with respect to the unusual and 
  extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
  and economy of the United States posed by the proliferation of 
  nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass 
  destruction") and the means of delivering such weapons.  Because 
  the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means 
  of delivering them continues to pose an unusual and 
  extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, 
  and economy of the United States, the national emergency 
  declared on November 14, 1994, must continue in effect beyond 
  November 14, 1995.  Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) 
  of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am 
  continuing the national emergency declared in Executive Order 
  No. 12938.
  
       This notice shall be published in the Federal Register 
  and transmitted to the Congress.
  
  
  
  
                                     WILLIAM J. CLINTON
  
  
  
  
  THE WHITE HOUSE,
      November 8, 1995.
  
  
  
  
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